The UK’s New Home Guard: What It Could Mean for National Security and Civil Resilience
In a recent move reflecting increasing geopolitical instability, the UK Government has announced plans to establish a new domestic civil defence force—effectively reviving the concept of the Home Guard. Originally formed during World War II to protect Britain from invasion, this modern version is designed to confront a very different set of threats: sabotage of infrastructure, cyber attacks, and the strain on stretched military and policing resources.
The proposal, currently at the planning stage, would see thousands of volunteers trained and deployed to defend the UK’s critical national infrastructure and support police and military forces in domestic operations. But this announcement raises important questions about the scale, purpose, and potential impact of such a force—and who exactly might serve in it.
A Domestic Force with a Clear Mandate
Unlike regular armed forces, the modern Home Guard is explicitly domestic. There are no plans for overseas deployment. Instead, the force would be deployed across the UK to secure high-value targets such as power stations, airfields, ports, rail hubs, water treatment facilities, and data centres—locations increasingly seen as vulnerable to attacks from hostile states and terrorist cells.
Early indications suggest this will not be a ceremonial or symbolic deployment. Volunteers may be embedded into real-time security efforts, working alongside established bodies such as the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the National Crime Agency (NCA), and local police services. This makes the Home Guard not just a visible deterrent but also a functional security asset, allowing full-time police and military units to focus on strategic or high-threat operations.
Recruitment: A New Approach to Eligibility
One of the most significant features of this proposal is the broadening of eligibility. In contrast to traditional military or reservist recruitment, the new Home Guard is expected to open its doors to a wider cross-section of the public. This includes individuals who are medically or otherwise ineligible for regular service but who are capable, committed, and available for domestic duty.
That could include:
Individuals with mild chronic conditions (such as asthma, food intolerances, Raynaud’s syndrome, or dermatitis) who are fit for light or moderate physical tasks but currently excluded from formal military entry.
Those with a history of controlled health conditions—including recovered cancer patients, transplant recipients, or people on stable long-term medication.
Older volunteers, including those well beyond the upper age limits typically imposed by the military (34 for enlisted soldiers, 48 for officers).
Former service personnel, either regulars or reservists, who have aged out of eligibility but remain interested in contributing.
This approach serves two goals: it allows for rapid scaling of personnel without lowering the medical standards required for frontline or combat units, and it creates an opportunity for citizens who have historically been shut out of uniformed service to make a valuable contribution to public safety.
Training, Roles, and Responsibility
Volunteers will not receive combat training equivalent to that of regular forces. Instead, training is expected to be streamlined and focused on:
Security and observation: Patrolling infrastructure, logging anomalies, identifying potential threats.
Basic tactical response: Managing crowds during crises, responding to emergencies, securing perimeters.
Coordination and reporting: Operating communications equipment, relaying information to police or command centres.
Crisis support: Assisting in logistical roles during civil emergencies such as blackouts, cyber outages, flooding, or mass evacuations.
This enables a high degree of readiness without overcommitting financial or institutional resources. The training model would likely resemble that of the Civil Contingencies Reserves or parts of the Royal Voluntary Service—modular, locally delivered, and mission-specific.
Integration with Civil and Security Infrastructure
The Home Guard could serve as a “force multiplier” for several national agencies. By absorbing some of the duties currently handled by police or military support units, it could significantly ease the burden on services already stretched thin by both budgetary and manpower constraints.
Some examples of this integration might include:
Working in coordination with the Civil Nuclear Constabulary to bolster on-site security at nuclear sites and research facilities.
Providing surge capacity to police during large-scale public events, political summits, or high-alert scenarios.
Assisting the National Crime Agency with background operations, such as surveillance support or perimeter security during raids and anti-trafficking operations.
Acting as liaisons to local councils, helping to implement evacuation or emergency contingency plans in the case of natural disasters, pandemics, or mass cyber disruptions.
Over time, it’s possible that dedicated Home Guard detachments could be embedded at key sites across the UK, permanently stationed to monitor threats, conduct regular drills, and maintain community engagement in preparedness.
Funding and Sustainability
The financial model of the Home Guard will likely follow the volunteer reservist route—offering modest pay per training day, travel expenses, and a commitment-based bonus system. The low cost per head compared to regular forces is one of its most compelling features. The aim is to maintain a semi-professional domestic force at a fraction of the cost of expanding the full-time military or police.
However, questions remain:
Will recruitment meet expectations, particularly for roles that require high levels of commitment without full-time salaries?
Can adequate standards be maintained without the traditional filters of fitness, discipline, and continuous service?
Will this be a stepping stone to regular military careers for some, or a terminal role for others?
Public trust will depend heavily on the professionalism of the training and how seriously the role is treated within the chain of command.
Risks and Concerns
No policy of this scale is without its challenges. Some of the key risks that must be managed include:
Creeping militarisation of domestic life: Clear boundaries must be set to ensure the Home Guard supports civilian authority, not replaces it.
Oversight and accountability: Like any uniformed service, the Home Guard must be subject to codes of conduct, public complaints procedures, and independent scrutiny.
Scope creep: While initially designed for infrastructure protection, there will be temptation to use these units in more aggressive or politically sensitive contexts (e.g., protests, immigration enforcement).
Recruitment quality: Looser medical or age criteria may invite scrutiny about capability and reliability under pressure. A robust screening and review process is essential.
A Civil Defence Framework for a Changing World
The resurrection of the Home Guard isn’t about nostalgia—it’s about adapting to a security environment where threats are as likely to come from a cyber breach or infrastructure failure as from conventional warfare. In this context, the presence of trained, uniformed, and locally embedded volunteers is not just a symbolic act of deterrence. It is a practical one. What’s being proposed isn’t a standing army or a militia—it’s a modern civil defence force that fills the gaps between police, military, and community resilience.
If implemented carefully, it could become one of the most significant developments in UK domestic security policy in decades.
